

1968/3

SECURITY GRADING
document contained in it. The appropriate upgrading slip must be affixed when ever necessary.)

Contents checked
for transfer to
D.R.O.
(Sgd.)
Date

CONFIDENTIAL

YEAR
STAMP

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH
OFFICE

DEPT.

NEAR EASTERN

FILE No. NE Q 2/1 (Part)

TITLE: IRAQ: Political Affairs (External) General and Multilateral
Iraqi Policy towards other countries

DONOT RETAIN FILES AND PAPERS UNNECESSARILY
RETURN THEM TO REGISTRY FOR B.U. OR P.A.

REFER TO			REFER TO			REFER TO		
NAME (and dept. when necessary)	TO SEE:	DATE	NAME (and dept. when necessary)	TO SEE:	DATE	NAME (and dept. when necessary)	TO SEE:	DATE
Registry		18/10						
Mr Makinson	①	18/10						
AN	①	22/10						
WED.	①							
Mr Summerville		24/10						
Registry		16/12						
F.E.D. JPS		11/12						
Hong Kong Dep.		19/12						
Registry		8/1						
D.G.M.		9/1						
Reg		28/2						
P. Acland		28/2						
P. H.		4/3						
Registry								

Registry Address

Room No. 115,
F.O. Building,
Downing Street.

NE Q 2/1

PART

SECURITY GRADING

N.B. The grading of this file must be the same as that of the highest graded document contained in it.
UPGRADE AS NECESSARY USING APPROPRIATELY COLOURED LABELS:

UNCL DENTIAL

YEAR STAMP


1968/3

CONFIDENTIAL

①



BRITISH EMBASSY,
BAGHDAD.



17/10 12 October 1968
American ~~Report~~ *Report*
WED. *in* *London*
Reg

Dear Donald,

Mr. Busse, the Head of the German Interests Section of the French Embassy, has told H.M. Ambassador that he had heard indirectly from the present Minister of Agriculture that it was the policy of the present government to establish relations with all countries, i.e. including West Germany and the U.S.A. Mr. Busse had heard that General Takriti had said something similar. H.M. Ambassador had had the same impression when speaking to General Takriti and also the Iraqis probably thought that nothing could be done until after the American elections.

2. The Baghdad Observer of 1 October, publishing extracts from an interview given by President Bakr to Der Spiegel recently, states that the President said West German leaders must change their attitude and approach the Arab States direct "when they wish to be friends with the Arabs again".

3. Meanwhile the Americans continue to have a bad press.

Yours ever
Saunders


(A. E. Saunders)

D. J. Makinson, Esq.,
Eastern Department,
Foreign Office.

c.c. Chanceries:
Bonn,
Washington.

CONFIDENTIAL

(1/8)



See 3 mtd,

BRITISH EMBASSY,
R.E. 11/12
BAGHDAD.
F.E. D. for Boyd 13/12
7 December, 1968
IAD. (M. Macdonald)
PD (L. Pirkham) BRP 24/12
25/12

Anglo/Iraqi Relations

You will have seen from our telegram No. 12 Saving of 7 December that I left a bout de papier today with the Director General of Public Relations at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the Chinese detention of Anthony Grey and others.

2. I think you will agree that in the circumstances Hindawi's reaction was very satisfactory. Even though it may turn out that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs decide on reflection not to publish, or if the paper does appear in print it will be heavily edited, the fact remains that the immediate reaction was both positive and promising. I should mention at this point that Hindawi is not the slippery effendi type who will smilingly promise everything knowing that he proposes to do nothing. He is a senior official of experience who takes his conversations seriously and who, as we know in another context involving one of the other Embassies, can be very touchy about anything which might give offence. His attitude in this case was therefore to my mind genuinely forthcoming.

NEQ 1/1

3. After talking about Grey, I mentioned the bad press which the B.B.C. and certain British newspapers and agencies had been given last week (our telegram No. 491 of 4 December) and I asked in particular what the B.B.C. had said to upset everyone. Mr. Hindawi confessed that he had not looked into the matter formally, but if I was asking him officially he would do so. I said that I was simply mentioning the matter en passant for my own satisfaction. (I did not want to take him up officially because it would only lead to a ding dong exchange which would be prolonged, and from which in the end we might come out worse off.) Since I was speaking privately, however, I took advantage of the opportunity to say I thought it was rather silly to give such publicity to what the B.B.C. had said. They were known in the Arab world for being objective and factual and if they had said there had been mass arrests, people might well believe the B.B.C. story when it was so vehemently attacked in the local press. Also by saying that London and Tel Aviv were "apportioning roles" they were also putting the stamps of respectability and truth on the Israelis. Mr. Hindawi played a very straight bat on this and restricted himself to saying that he thought it had all arisen because of irresponsible reports from Beirut. He is of course quite right to object on this score. I feel very strongly about most British journalists who prop up the Beirut bars, read the Beirut gutter press, are too lazy to see for themselves, publish exaggerated reports and leave it to us to clear up their mess.

See also
tel 521 of
11 Dec.

/4.

D. J. Makinson, Esq.,
Near East Department,
F.C.O.,

CONFIDENTIAL



NEQ 1/2

4. Mr. Hindawi then referred to my previous visit and to my representations about offensive remarks about us in the local press (paragraph 3 of our telegram No. 10 Saving of 14 November). He volunteered that he had submitted to Ministers pointing out how we felt about such matters and that they had taken note. It occurs to me that there is just a faint possibility that this might have been one of the reasons we were not singled out by name in the slogans shouted in the mass demonstration on 4 December. I am too cynical to believe it. On the other hand someone must have passed the word around that Britain should not be mentioned by name when all the other stops were pulled out.

5. Mr. Hindawi made a number of other points in our conversation which suggest that he seriously wished us to co-operate actively. Amongst other things he said that we were perhaps losing out by not publishing a news bulletin. The Ministry's policy is to encourage Embassies to do so on a reciprocal basis since it gives them an opportunity to put across their point of view. They, the Iraqis, were allowed to do so in London so there would be no problem in our doing so here. I said that we hoped to have an Information Officer in the New Year. I then told him of a conversation I had had earlier this week with the Director General of Radio and Television who had asked for a number of films from us on a variety of subjects, including the teaching of English by television.

6. As I left, I mentioned that I had just read in the paper that the Iraqi Ambassador in London had paid a courtesy call on Lord Chalfont the previous day. Mr. Hindawi had not seen the item but said that he was pleased to hear it and hoped that we could now get on with restoring relations to the level they had been in the past.

Yours etc.
A. E. Saunders

(A. E. Saunders)

c.c.

P. Joy, Esq.,
Beirut.

CONFIDENTIAL
SAVING TELEGRAM

TOP COPY

3

BY BAG

BAGHDAD TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TEL ¹² ~~U/N~~ SAVING

7 DECEMBER 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 15 13 DEC 1968 NEQ 2/1
--

ADDRESSED TO FCO TEL U/N SAVING OF 7 DECEMBER.
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION SAVING TO BEIRUT (FOR JOY).

YOUR TELEGRAMS NOS. GUIDANCE 295 AND 296 OF 28 NOVEMBER:

CHINESE DETENTION OF ANTHONY GREY AND OTHERS.

MR. SAUNDERS, FIRST SECRETARY, CALLED THIS MORNING ON THE
DIRECTOR GENERAL OF PUBLIC RELATIONS AT THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND LEFT WITH HIM A BOUT DE PAPIER COVERING THE POINTS
MENTIONED IN THE TELEGRAMS UNDER REFERENCE.

2. AS WE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE TO ASK IN THE
FIRST INSTANCE FOR THE FACTS TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE GOVERNMENT-
CONTROLLED PRESS, MR. SAUNDERS PRESENTED THE BOUT DE PAPIER AS
BEING FOR THE MINISTRY'S INFORMATION. THE DIRECTOR GENERAL
IMMEDIATELY ASKED, HOWEVER, WHETHER WE WISHED IT TO BE PUBLISHED,
ADDING THAT PROVIDED IT CONTAINED NOTHING WHICH WOULD UPSET THE
CHINESE HE WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT SUCH A REQUEST FOR PUBLICITY.
MR. SAUNDERS READILY ACCEPTED THE OFFER AND ASSURED MR. HINDAWI
THAT WHEN HE READ THE PAPER HE WOULD FIND IT FACTUAL AND FREE OF
POLEMICS. THE DIRECTOR GENERAL THEN READ IT AND SAID SOTTO VOCE
THAT HE FOUND NOTHING OBJECTIONABLE IN IT AND WOULD PASS IT TO HIS
MINISTRY'S "CENSOR". IF HE CLEARED IT, THERE WOULD BE NO OBJECTION
TO OUR CARRYING OUT THE NEXT STAGE OF THE OPERATION, NAMELY TO
HAND A COPY TO THE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION.

3. ALTHOUGH THIS IS SATISFACTORY SO FAR, THERE ARE A NUMBER OF
OBSTACLES TO BE OVERCOME BEFORE WE CAN COUNT ON OBTAINING FAVOURABLE
PUBLICITY.

MR. EVANS

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N. EAST. D.

H.K.D.

I.R.D.

GUIDANCE D.

NEWS D.

CONS. D.

P.U.S.D.

RES. D.

E. EUR. & SOV. D.

MB 8/1 PA.

CONFIDENTIAL

QQQQQ

British Embassy, (4)

BAGHDAD.

(2/20)

Reps.
Re 10. m
its content
Chronological
Parten!

CONFIDENTIAL

18 January 1969

RECEIVED III
ARCHIVES No 15
24 JAN 1969
NEQ 2/1

Dear Donald,

Iraq's Foreign Policy

R.E.
17/5

The Baghdad Observer of 16 January carried an English translation of an interview given by Abdul Karim al-Sheikhly, the Foreign Minister, to a correspondent of Alef Ba. Much of the interview is taken up with expounding well-known attitudes, and I will comment only on those points which offer something of particular interest.

2. As one would expect, the first question is about Iraqi policy on Palestine. The main point of interest here is the explicit statement that Iraq "has rejected" the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967. Although it has been evident previously that the Iraqis found the resolution unpalatable and the government-controlled press has criticised it and the idea of a political solution of the Palestine problem, Sheikhly's statement on this occasion goes rather further than official spokesmen have done in the past. In spite of this, the Iraqi position is still probably the same as it was in October 1968 when Sheikhly told the Czech Ambassador that, while not accepting the resolution, the Iraqi Government would not make difficulties for the U.A.R. and Jordan if they came to terms with Israel (our telegram No. 306 of 8 October).

3. Speaking of relations with the U.A.R. and Syria, the Minister said that relations with the former were good and strong and were making progress satisfactory to both sides. He also referred to Iraq's interest in developing the Unified Political Leadership, a matter which, he said, had remained merely on paper over the past four years. He was, understandably, even less fulsome about relations with Syria.

4. Turning to the next question, which was about relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, the Minister said that in view of the support which they had given the Arabs it was natural that the present régime should have addressed itself to the task of further strengthening relations with them. One way in which this had been done was by establishing new Iraqi diplomatic missions in certain countries and raising the level of representation elsewhere. Trade and technical and cultural co-operation had also been extended, while the State visit of the President of Poland had yielded positive benefits.

/5.

D. J. Makinson,
Near Eastern Department,
F.C.O.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

5. After a condemnation of American "aggression" on Vietnam couched in routine terms, Sheikhly went on to talk about relations with the West which, he said, varied from one country to another because Iraq decided her policy towards others in the light of their attitude towards Arab problems in general and the Palestine question in particular. Spain therefore merited first mention because she did not recognise Israel and supported the Arabs. "In return," Sheikhly continued, "Iraq has supported Spain's sovereignty in Gibraltar," thus making clear the interested nature of Iraq's policy on the subject. France also was praised for her Middle Eastern policies. Incidentally the Ambassador, when he saw Sheikhly on 10 January said that the "principle" on which Iraq decided her foreign policy was equally valid for others and that if Iraq wanted more co-operation from e.g. the United Kingdom, she should show more consideration for British interests e.g. Gibraltar. Sheikhly merely mumbled something about Northern Ireland. The remaining Western European countries, with the exception of Britain and West Germany, were regarded by Iraq as the victims of Israeli propaganda and imperialist pressure. The Foreign Minister said that the natural reaction to the unfriendly attitudes of these European countries was to divert trade away from them as much as possible and to press on with efforts to put across Arab views. (Donald Hawley has reported in his letter of 11 January to Moore that we have heard that the Iraqis are not importing consumer goods from Italy, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Rumania, Poland and Japan and are reducing import quotas for capital goods from Italy, Denmark, Finland and Greece. Although these restrictions have partly been imposed in view of Iraq's unfavourable balance of trade with these countries, there is also almost certainly in view of the Minister's remarks, a connexion with the Palestine question.) Britain, however, had adopted a definite (whatever that means) policy towards Arab problems and had taken an unfriendly and negative attitude towards the Palestine question. There was no change in Iraq's policy regarding diplomatic relations with West Germany.

6. It is somewhat surprising that Sheikhly should have singled out Britain for criticism on the Palestine issue. Admittedly he told the Ambassador on 10 January that he considered H.M.G.'s attitude to the raid on Beirut airport and the question of compensation far from clear and that Arab Ambassadors in London had been dissatisfied, but he conceded that our relations had improved even though not quickly enough (our telegram No. 31 of 11 January). One must accept, I suppose, that the Iraqis will be satisfied with nothing less than unequivocal support for the Arabs and hostility towards Israel matching their own.

7. Sheikhly spoke encouragingly of relations with Iran. Although they had temporarily deteriorated after the régime came to power on 17 July 1968, the Iranian invitation to General Takriti and himself to visit Iran had improved the atmosphere and had led to greater mutual confidence. The joint committee, set up to discuss common problems would, he said, get down to business later this month.

/8.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

8. The Minister outlined steps taken by Iraq to strengthen ties with the Gulf States, the most important of which was in his view the abolition of Iraqi visas for their nationals. We have noted some increase in the number of visits being made to the Gulf by Iraqi officials concerned with trade, a development mentioned also by Sheikhy.

9. The only remaining points worthy of note are that the Foreign Minister reiterated that Iraq would not resume relations with the United States so long as the U.S. supported (the forces of) aggression, meaning Israel, and that he alluded to the steps being taken to improve the efficiency of Iraq's diplomatic service. As he puts it, "there are continued efforts to evaluate people (in the service) from the standpoint of loyalty to the revolution and from the standpoint of efficiency." In other words, loyalty to the present régime is one of the most, if not the most important consideration, and in this field as in others the Ba'athis are putting in their own men as quickly as they can.

Yours ever,

P. McKearney

(P. McKearney)

E.C.

Chanceries

Amman
Beirut
Cairo
Tehran
Washington
UKMis New York
Bahrain Residency
Kuwait

CONFIDENTIAL

28
JAN 2

UNCLASSIFIED

5

~~Mr. A. C. ...~~

Archie ... will not
celebrate this!

entire

PMH

27/2.

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 15 2012
NEQ 2/1

BRITISH EMBASSY,
BAGHDAD.

25 February 1969

Dear Residency,

Israeli Activities in the Gulf

According to Al-Nuz (Kurdish/Talabani) of 25 February, the Iraqi Council of Ministers has approved a Ministry of the Interior proposal to strengthen relations between Iraq and the Gulf Emirates.

2. The proposal is said to include the opening of cultural and information centres in Bahrain, Qatar, Dubai and Abu Dhabi, and to study the possibility of giving assistance in raising the cultural and health standards in these states. It will encourage technicians, teachers and Iraqi companies to operate in the Gulf and invite personalities from the Emirates to visit Iraq.

Yours ever,

(A. E. Saunders)

Bahrain Residency.

c.c. Bahrain Agency
Qatar
Dubai
Abu Dhabi
Chancery, Kuwait
Near Eastern Department, F.C.O.
Arabian Department, F.C.O.

PA/MMM

3/3

Iraqi Criticism of UNBaghdad home service in Arabic 19.00 GMT 19.9.69

Excerpts from "Events of the Week" comment:

The UN General Assembly agenda includes three major topics - the Zionist-imperialist aggression against the Arab nation, the US aggression against the Vietnamese people, and Chinese UN membership, now unjustly held by the US agent clique of Chiang Kai-shek...

Since its establishment 25 years ago, the UN has been unable to achieve any of the peoples' aims. Many peoples have been enslaved under its banner. What is happening in South Korea now is an example. The present session will be similar to previous sessions, a mere international platform that cannot change the course of events in any part of the world.

Since its establishment by imperialism and since it received the blessings of the UN, Israel has ignored, violated and ridiculed UN resolutions and even challenged these resolutions, disregarding the UN Charter and recommendations. Has the UN been able to repel the aggression? All signs indicate that the peoples can only recover their rights through struggle and not through UN resolutions...

The absence of China from the UN is a disgrace to the organisation. China's presence at the UN would not change anything in China nor would it give China additional strength. The reverse is more likely because the UN needs China's membership, while outside the UN, China has made enormous strides in its modern history and in developing its resurgence. To ignore its role in international society is a kind of madness. So China's presence at the UN would strengthen the UN's position more than China's position. Even the NATO member-States are seeking to establish relations with China, as Canada and Italy are now doing. China now occupies a remarkable position in the world.

The USA, which is trying to exploit the Soviet-Chinese conflict to its own advantage and that of the imperialist camp by delaying China's UN membership, will not be successful in its attempt. The arrival of the Soviet Premier, Aleksey Kosygin, in Peking and his meetings with the Chinese Premier, Chou En-lai, disappointed the USA and its allies and lowered the hopes which they had pinned to the Moscow-Peking conflict. The Soviet Premier's visit to China revived hopes of eliminating the causes of the split in the socialist camp through the re-establishment of some kind of co-operation and thereafter understanding, the restoration of unity in the socialist camp, and the elimination of all obstacles. It is evident that the peoples' struggle against the common imperialist enemy dictates the unification of efforts and resources to confront effectively imperialism, led by the USA...

Richard Nixon's address at the UN General Assembly, in which he shamelessly affirmed US support for aggression against the Arab nation, confirms the extent of US adherence to the logic of aggression. It must be clear that the US attitude was expected by the Arabs. There is no doubt that US-Israeli cohesion is natural and fateful. It will not change the Arab attitude in the enemy's interest. On the contrary, it will increase the Arab's determination to resist aggression and to mobilise all their capabilities to crush the aggression, to win victory, and to establish the just peace they want and not that which others want.

Haykal on External Threats to Libyan RevolutionCairo in Arabic home service 13.15 and "Voice of the Arabs" 17.45 GMT 19.9.69

Excerpts from broadcast version of 'Al-Ahram' article by Hasanayn Haykal, entitled "Positions of danger":

I still believe that the Libyan revolution is the most important issue in the Arab world and that it will continue to rank among the most important events in our Arab lands

A. THE ARAB WORLD AND ISRAELIsraeli Comment on Situation in EgyptIsrael in English 11.30 GMT 19.9.69

Text of commentary by Yehud Ben Yisarel:

A growing spate of rumours about the situation in Egypt has been emanating from Beirut in the past few days. These followed the announcement made - not in the Egyptian capital, but by the Jordanian Prime Minister in Amman - about President Nasir's serious illness.

President Nasir's trip to Moscow, preparations for which had been public property for quite some time, with even the exact dates announced at the beginning of the week, was cancelled and followed by a curious statement by the Egyptian Minister of Information that it had never been contemplated. Then came the still unconfirmed report about the confining of ex-Premier Ali Sabri to house arrest and subsequently the now officially announced removal of the Chief of Staff and Commander of the Navy three days after the successful Israeli landing on the Gulf of Suez.

The very profusion of these rumours and announcements, combined with Cairo's curious behaviour in allowing these reports first to emanate from abroad, seems to provide clear evidence of the confusion now engulfing the Egyptian capital, to an extent that this is based on disagreement about the policy to be pursued both in the area and in the world at large.

It is now 17 years since the army coup which removed King Faruq. The differences between the aims then proudly announced by the group of free officers who perpetrated the revolt and the situation in which Egypt now finds herself are obvious. Having come to power primarily in order to achieve Egypt's liberation from excessive dependence on Britain, Cairo's subservience to Moscow today is far deeper and more all-embracing, with Egypt even having lost its much cherished possibility of trying to play one bloc off against the other.

When President Nasir published his "Philosophy of the Revolution" in 1953, he spoke of three concentric circles - the Arab world, the Islamic bloc and Africa - in which Egypt was allegedly destined to play the lead. All these have come to naught.

In the Arab world, following upon the disastrous war in the Yemen and the abortive union with Syria, Egypt has now been reduced to economic dependence on the feudal regimes in the oil-rich States, instead of continuing to plot against them in the name of Arab socialism. And while all the attempts of the Egyptian President to convene an Arab summit have proved failures, his rival, King Faysal, has been successful in his call for an Islamic conference due to be held shortly in Rabat.

Economically Egypt has gotten nowhere, with its once-lucrative tourist traffic virtually non-existent, with shortages of consumer goods in the country, and with life in general deep in the doldrums. And above all the battle against Israel, into which Egypt has poured its major energies and efforts: there was nothing but failure, with two crushing defeats, with Sinai and the bank of the Suez Canal in Israeli hands, and with the war of attrition so proudly proclaimed by President Nasir in fact operating against Egypt. Under these circumstances a serious soul-searching is obviously called for, and the latest developments in Cairo seem to indicate much rumbling and conflict.

Iraqi Foreign Policy. British Embassy Comment On Iraqs Foreign Policy. 25 Feb. 1969. MS Middle East Online: Iraq, 1914-1974: Selected files from series AIR, CAB, CO, FCO, FO, PREM, T, WO, The National Archives, Kew, UK FCO 17/873. The National Archives (Kew, United Kingdom). Archives Unbound, link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5107474256/GDSC?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-GDSC&xid=af70d60f&pg=1. Accessed 11 Apr. 2022.